



Table of Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 3 
II. Background .............................................................................................................................................. 5 
Role of Supreme Court Law Clerks .......................................................................................................... 5 
Impartial Justices ...................................................................................................................................... 7 
III. Literature Review .................................................................................................................................... 8 
Law Clerk Ideology .................................................................................................................................. 9 
Law Clerk Gender ................................................................................................................................... 14 
IV. Theory ................................................................................................................................................... 16 
Principal Agent Theory ........................................................................................................................... 16 
A Theory of Female Law Clerk Influence .............................................................................................. 17 
Critical Mass Theory ............................................................................................................................... 19 
V. Methodology .......................................................................................................................................... 20 
Analysis Model ....................................................................................................................................... 20 
Independent Variables ............................................................................................................................ 20 
Dependent Variable ................................................................................................................................ 21 
Control Variables .................................................................................................................................... 22 
Data ......................................................................................................................................................... 23 
VI. Data Analysis ........................................................................................................................................ 25 
Testing Hypotheses 1 and 3: The number of female law clerks impacts judicial decision making in 
cases concerning civil rights ................................................................................................................... 29 
Testing Hypotheses 2 and 4: The number of female law clerks impacts judicial decision making in 
cases concerning discrimination ............................................................................................................. 32 
VII. Discussion ........................................................................................................................................... 35 
VIII. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 38 
Appendix A: ................................................................................................................................................ 39 









The purpose of this thesis paper is to provide an examination of the question “to what extent 
has the gender of Supreme Court legal clerks impacted the role of judicial decision making 
during the 2004–2017 terms?” The Supreme Court, perhaps more than any other branch of 
government in the United States, makes its contribution to the fabric of America through the 
establishment of precedent. This precedent, valued and venerated by every generation of 
Supreme Court Justices, ensures that the legal power of any decision or influential published 
opinion has the capacity to exert binding influence over the country well after the time of its 
authors. Given the gravity of this power, justices are selected and then scrutinized through a 
lengthy vetting process that involves both formal and informal examination and approval by the 
executive and legislative branches. The advantage of this involved selection process is the 
enjoyment of lifetime tenure for each justice—barring constitutionally-mandated impeachment—
, ensuring that they might exercise their credible and distinguished judgment on important 
constitutional questions while remaining insulated from public opinion.    
 However, in recent years, this model of the Supreme Court Justice as impartial legal 
expert has been challenged. At the beginning of the 21st century, Supreme Court scholars began 
to question whether justices truly operated in a vacuum and began a thorough examination of 
factors that might have purchase on justice decision making, varying from the solicitor general, 
congressional influence, presidential pressure, interest group lobbying, and law clerks (Peppers 
and Zorn, 2008). Of all the external factors that might influence a justice’s decision making, 
perhaps the most direct is that of Supreme Court law clerks. Law clerks at the level of the 
Supreme Court are traditionally graduates of prestigious law schools and have experience 
clerking under federal judges on United States district and appellate courts; four law clerks are 
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selected per associate justice per one year term, and aid the justice in a variety of tasks, including 
screening for potential lower-court cases to grant a writ of Certiorari—the formal process used in 
raising a legal case to the level of the Supreme Court—, providing input and research on a given 
case for a justice, and even drafting official opinions. Consequently, Supreme Court law clerks 
have the potential to exert a considerable amount of influence over the docket, thought, and 
legally-binding decisions of justices.        
 Social Science research through both qualitative case studies and quantitative measures 
has begun to provide empirical evidence for the extent of this influence, although many areas of 
the discipline require further research (Baum, 2014; Gleason et al., 2018). Notably, an 
examination of the law clerks themselves, and the individual factors that might influence a 
justice, is a small but burgeoning field of research (Kromphardt, 2015; Bonica et al., 2016). In 
my paper, I investigate a section of research on Supreme Court law clerks, or how the gender of 
law clerks influences the direction of justice voting in cases of civil rights and discrimination. 
My approach is significant because it provides a better glimpse into an understudied section of 
the literature on law clerks, both through its analysis of judicial decision making in several novel 
case issue areas and for its period of analysis between the years of 2004 and 2017. An analysis of 
these case issues—beyond conventional gender issues such as sex discrimination and abortion— 
is possible by adopting a model of female law clerk credibility that extends to issues of 
discrimination and civil rights, arguing that female law clerks will be, on average, more likely 
than their male counterparts to hold and be valued for their liberal ideological positions on these 
issues by dint of similar and shared experiences in gender issues. Because the actual 
manifestation of the model of female law clerk credibility may be difficult to locate in one place, 
I both analyze cases dealing with civil rights and cases that capture issues of discrimination in a 
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subset of the civil rights cases. Given the importance of the Supreme Court in the United States, 
any advancement in understanding about the factors that influence judicial decision is a 
worthwhile goal.   
II. Background 
Before providing an assessment of the literature on the law clerks of the Supreme Court, it is 
important to give an overview of the function and characteristics of law clerks throughout the 
history of the Court, in addition to the changing perception of justices as impartial arbiters of the 
law. 
Role of Supreme Court Law Clerks 
Law clerks have not always been an integral part of Supreme Court proceedings, and their role in 
assisting justices has varied significantly over the Court’s history: there is no clause in Article III 
of the United States Constitution that pertains to the powers and scope of judicial staff, and no 
law clerks were present at the establishment of the Court in 1789.  The first clerk was hired over 
90 years after the Court’s inception by Justice Horace Gray, and fulfilled the role of 
stenographer—a role that significantly differs from the functions law clerks began to assume 
throughout the 20th century (Garrow, 1999; Peppers, 2006). In 1919, Congress allowed justices 
to hire a law clerk that was able to complete many of the functions of a modern law clerk and 
increased that number again in the 1950s (Peppers and Zorn, 2008). Concerning the present 
day’s law clerk regulations, Associate Justices typically hire 4 law clerks per term, with the 
Chief Justice being allowed 5—for the period of analysis of this paper, Chief Justice Roberts 
aligns with the Associate Justices and hires only 4 law clerks per term (Peppers and Zorn, 2008; 
Kromphardt, 2015).           
 Importantly, since the 1960s, law clerks hired by members of the Supreme Court 
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frequently share a number of prestigious credentials. The majority of law clerks that are hired 
during this time frame are the graduates of prestigious law schools from elite universities, and 
have substantial prior clerking experience: in analysis of the backgrounds of Supreme Court law 
clerks starting in the 1970s, Baum notes that 86% of the law clerks hired by justices had 
previously clerked for judges on federal district and appellate courts (Peppers, 2006; Baum, 
2014). Additionally, only a fraction of these law clerks have been female or members of a 
minority group.           
 While the representation of women and minority law clerks has slowly increased over the 
past 30 years, they still constitute a minority of the overall number of law clerks, with 
percentages of female law clerks fluctuating between 20% and 40% over this period. 
Consequently, law clerks in the 20th and early 21st century have shared several core descriptive 
similarities, in that the majority are white male graduates of elite universities that have previous 
clerking experience (Kaheny et al., 2015; Kromhardt, 2015).     
 The function of these law clerks is most broadly to aid their justices in completing their 
duties, although the scope of this aid is largely conditional on the preferences of the justice 
(Bonica et al., 2018; Gulati and Posner, 2015). For example, Justice Blackmun, in excerpts from 
his personal papers, expressed approval for the delegation of certain judicial responsibilities to 
his law clerks, even going so far as allowing clerks to write entire opinions for him, such as in 
the landmark Supreme Court case Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Garrow, 1999; Greenhouse, 
2006; Collins, 2008). Conversely, anonymous testimony from former law clerks indicated that 
Justice Douglas assigned virtually no duties to his clerks (Peppers, 2006; Miller, 2014).   
 Despite some variations in judicial preferences, it appears as though law clerks frequently 
assist justices in a variety of duties that include researching current and lower-court cases, 
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discussion with justices, information gathering on the stances of other justices, and the drafting 
of case opinions (Peppers, 2006; Swanson and Wasby, 2008). These findings indicate that the 
role of law clerks, while varying to some degree between justices, is generally far-reaching and 
extends well beyond the position’s humble origins.       
 In summary, the position of Supreme Court law clerk has evolved over the course of the 
Court’s history, with an expansion of both the number and role of the clerks occurring in the 20th 
century. During this modern era of the court, law clerks are overwhelmingly experienced in 
working under district and appellate court judges and hold degrees from prestigious universities. 
Additionally, law clerks have historically been white males, a trend that continues to this day, 
although the expansion of law clerk assistance in judicial duties has become increasingly varied 
and substantial over time, ranging from correspondence with a justice on the merits of a case to 
the actual drafting of a justice’s opinions. 
Impartial Justices 
The lifelong appointments of justices are often touted as essential for an independent judiciary, a 
branch of the United States government that is insulated from the political pressures exerted on 
the legislative and executive branches (Peppers, 2006). This insulation often leads to discussion 
of justices as impartial legal experts that evaluate cases on their merits and avoid the pitfalls of 
political ideology (Loewenstem, 2003). Despite the prevalence of this view, scholars of the 
judiciary note that judicial decision making does not occur in a vacuum and can be grouped into 
a number of ideological categories (Segal and Cover, 1989; Martin and Quinn, 2002; Bonica et 
al., 2016). In addition to these scores, studies of judicial decision making relative to direct and 
indirect effects of public opinion and presidential elections indicate that the Court is susceptible 
to external influences (Mishler and Sheehan, 1993; Mishler and Sheehan, 1996). Given the 
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evidence that contradicts the notion of complete judicial impartiality, it becomes necessary to 
consider other factors that might exert influence on judicial decision making.   
 Importantly, Supreme Court law clerks are not immune to political ideology, and a 
number of studies have constructed measures of law clerk ideology on the basis of political 
contributions, self-reported partisanship, and the ideology of district and appellate court judges 
that they had previously clerked for (Peppers and Zorn, 2008; Kromphardt, 2017; Bonica et al., 
2018). This finding, in tandem with the proximity law clerks have to justices and the roles they 
play in selecting cases, discussing stances, and drafting opinions indicate that law clerks could 
have the capacity to exert a great deal of influence over judicial decision making.    
 The purpose of this section has been to provide an overview of the evolving roles and 
perceptions of law clerks and justices throughout the history of the Supreme Court. In 
establishing the extent to which law clerks aid justices in completing their duties, in addition to 
the ideological slant of justices and law clerks and the susceptibility of justices to certain 
influences, it becomes critical to next examine the literature on the topic in order to better 
understand how the presence of law clerks can impact judicial decision making. 
III. Literature Review 
Over the past 70 years, there has been a great amount of public interest in the ways in which 
Supreme Court law clerks impact the decision making of their justices. This interest has 
appeared most prominently in the public eye as a reaction to an article by a young William 
Rehnquist, who argued that the law clerks for ideologically-liberal justices were abusing their 
positions by exercising undue influence on their justices in the granting of writs of Certiorari for 
certain cases (Greenhouse, 2006). While there have been several popular books on the subject, 
until the turn of the 21st century, there was a relative dearth of academic research on the subject. 
9 
 
This absence of literature on Supreme Court law clerks may have been a problem of data 
collection, as the Supreme Court is notoriously insular and derives benefits from its impartial and 
apolitical reputation (Peppers, 2006; Miller, 2014); however, in the last several decades a small 
but burgeoning literature on Supreme Court law clerks has developed. Given the strength of the 
relationship between judicial ideology and judicial decision making, much of the literature on 
Supreme Court law clerks has been concerned with examining how the ideology and partisanship 
of law clerks impacts judicial decision making (Peppers, 2006). A smaller subsection of research 
has studied the ways in which characteristics of law clerks other than their ideology impact 
judicial decision making. In order to obtain the most comprehensive picture of research on 
Supreme Court law clerks, this literature review breaks down its analysis into these two 
categories. 
Law Clerk Ideology 
Although there are exceptions, the literature on law clerk influence primarily relies on principal 
agent theory to animate its association between law clerks and the justices that hire them: in 
2006, books by Peppers (2006) and Ward and Weiden (2006) examined the ways in which the 
law clerks impacted judicial decision through two different theoretical lenses of principal agent 
theory and institutionalism. Peppers’ principal agent theory posits that the principal, the justice, 
has a vested interest in ensuring that the agent, the law clerk, acts in alignment with their 
interests—namely, to accurately complete the tasks that are assigned to them, such as reviewing 
petitions for writs of Certiorari, writing or editing the draft of an opinion, or research. According 
to Peppers, an agent failing to act in alignment with judicial interests is defection, which “has 
been given a different label [in the literature]—influence” (12). Peppers conducted his research 
through a combination of personal interviews, surveys of background information and 
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partisanship, and judicial papers, studying the historical roles of law clerks beginning in 1882. 
He concluded that under his definition of influence, there was no evidence that law clerks had 
ever exerted it on their justices (206).         
 Conversely, Ward and Weiden (2006) utilized an institutionalist model that placed a 
greater emphasis on how changing institutional norms and practices led to the delegation of more 
duties to law clerks over time. Ward and Weiden conducted their analysis through in-depth 
surveys, interviews, and questionnaires of former law clerks relating to perceived influence and 
partisanship, focusing on certain periods in history such as the Rehnquist Court era. Using their 
less strict model of law clerk influences, they concluded that changing institutional norms 
corresponded with an increase in law clerk responsibility and influence, noting that while they 
did not wield coercive or complete influence over their justices, “clerks are not merely surrogates 
or agents” (246). Both books noted that the qualitative information obtained from surveys and 
interviews with former law clerks might be at risk of selection bias, as a not insignificant number 
of clerks declined to participate in the research. Furthermore, using the self-reported law clerk 
measures of influence risked their mischaracterizing or overstating their role in judicial decision 
making (Peppers, 2006; Ward and Weiden, 2006; Miller, 2014).    
 In the time since the publication of these diverging findings, an examination of the 
remaining studies in this section shows that law clerk ideology can be related to judicial decision 
making. In a follow up to his book, Peppers worked with Zorn (2008) to perform a quantitative 
analysis of law clerk influence on judicial decision making on the merits of all cases during a 
given term, as explained by principal agent theory. They conducted their analysis through the use 
of survey data on the partisanship of over 500 law clerks that served between the years of 1953 
and 2004, and found that there is a relationship between clerk partisanship and the decision 
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making of justices for all cases, concluding that their “findings with respect to clerk influence are 
compelling,” although they indicated that their study did not take into account all relevant 
institutional procedures (75). This finding is particularly significant given its reversal of Peppers’ 
paper in 2006 and demonstrates how important the operationalization of law clerk influence is to 
the analysis of a study’s results.        
 More recently, Black et al. (2014) examined how the law clerk assignment of grant or 
deny for petitions for writs of Certiorari related to justices accepting that recommendation, 
utilizing the theoretical framework of principal agent theory, and using a data set of petitions for 
writs of Certiorari during their analysis between the terms of 1986 to 1993.  They found that in 
instances where the partisanship of the recommending clerk and the ideology of the justice 
aligned with that of another justice, the latter justice exhibited an increased likelihood of 
accepting grant recommendations. According to Black et al., a justice evaluates the law clerk’s 
recommendation by “compar[ing] the law clerk’s recommendation with their own prior belief 
about a petition’s certworthiness,” and if these factors align, they are extremely likely to accept 
the recommendation (101). Although this paper intimates a connection between law clerk 
partisanship and judicial decision making in a select aspect of the Supreme Court agenda-setting 
process, there may be reasons to be skeptical about drawing far-reaching conclusions. Given the 
well-documented association between law clerk partisanship and law clerk selection by a justice, 
as well as the findings of the study being conditional on the ideology of the justice that hired the 
law clerk recommending a given action for a petition for writs of Certiorari, conclusions about 
the influence of law clerk partisanship might be accused of being endogenous relative to the 
ideology of the justice that hired them (Peppers and Zorn, 2008; Kaheny et al., 2015).   
 Kromphardt (2015) demonstrated how disconnects in information between law clerks and 
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their justice allowed law clerks to exercise influence over that justice between 1967 and 2007. 
Additionally, Kromphardt developed a novel measure of law clerk partisanship on the basis of 
the Judicial Common Space score of the district or appellate judge that they had previously 
clerked for and identified cases in which law clerk partisanship differed from that of the justice 
that hired them (Epstein et al., 2007). Utilizing a theory of information asymmetry in which the 
ideological divide between the law clerk and the justice served as an information source for the 
justice in a principal agent relationship, Kromphardt determined that in instances in which 
justices hired law clerks with diverging ideological beliefs, they were more likely to make 
decisions on the merits in alignment with the clerks’ partisanship.     
  Taken in the full context of other papers on the subject, Kromphardt’s account of 
informational asymmetries, or the notion that justices intentionally select law clerks with 
ideological leanings that are asymmetrical to their own, while not novel, is uncommon, and 
appears to contradict numerous studies that find a relationship between the ideology of justices 
and the law clerks that they hire: Peppers and Zorn (2008), Baum and Ditslear (2010), Baum 
(2014), Kaheny et al. (2015), and Bonica et al. (2016) all appear to provide accounts of law clerk 
selection that reverse this finding.         
 Finally, Bonica et al. (2018) examined the impact of variations in law clerk ideology on 
judicial decision making between 1960 and 2009. They constructed a multi-point measure of law 
clerk ideology by matching Supreme Court law clerks’ monetary contributions to political 
organizations over the duration of the clerks’ lives and compared it to the ideology of the justices 
that hired them while looking at the justices’ decisions on the merits of a given case. According 
to Bonica et al., “clerks exert modest influence on judicial voting overall, but substantial 
influence in cases that are high-profile, legally significant, or close decisions” (1). While the 
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measure of law clerk ideology employed by Bonica et al. may be subject to charges of selection 
bias given that 30% of former law clerks had not made financial contributions to a political 
organization, the ability of the measure to map multiple points of law clerk ideology allows for a 
nuanced examination of the connection between law clerks and their justices that is absent in 
design of most studies in this literature review.       
 This body of literature provides evidence for an imperfect but general association 
between law clerk partisanship or ideology and judicial decision making. Although Peppers 
(2006) initially found no evidence that law clerks exerted influence on their justices, this finding 
may be dependent on the book’s definition of influence: when influence is operationalized as a 
defection from the objective of the principal that the principal then accepts, an incredibly strong 
relationship is required for this standard to be met. Under this view, only an instance of a law 
clerk actually changing their justice’s mind on the direction of their vote in a case would 
constitute a clear example of law clerk influence, a standard that Peppers rightly identified as 
nearly impossible (2006, 206). Given that every other study in this literature review found some 
degree of association between law clerk ideology and justice decision making—including in a 
follow up paper by Peppers and Zorn (2008)—, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
conclusions drawn in this book are not representative of the relationship between law clerks and 
justices. Importantly, principal agent theory is used as a prominent theoretical tool in this 
literature, and the prevalence of this model may be indicative of its theoretical explanatory power 
in describing the relationship between law clerks as agents and justices as principals.   
 Notably, an institutionalist framework, while only directly utilized by Ward and Weiden 
(2006), is listed in several studies as an important component in identifying a causal mechanism 
of law clerk ideology over judicial decision making (Peppers and Zorn, 2008; Kromphardt, 
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2015). Given researcher sensitivity to the benefits of analyzing institutional norms and 
procedures, reasons for an absence of institutionalist analysis in other papers may be a result of 
either difficulty in obtaining relevant data due to the private nature of justices and law clerks, or 
concern about the limitations of the qualitative methods often employed in this approach, either 
due to selection bias or concerns about the reliability of law clerk responses.    
 Altogether, this body of literature on law clerk ideology contributes to this thesis paper 
by establishing justification for the possibility of an influencing relationship between law clerks 
and their justices, indicating the importance of controlling for law clerk ideology or partisanship 
when examining the impact of another law clerk characteristic on judicial decision making, and 
giving evidence for the  utility of principal agent theory. 
Law Clerk Gender 
The literature on law clerk gender is sparse, and primarily descriptive or observational, rather 
than analytical, in nature; however, there several concrete analyses of female law clerks on 
judicial decision making to be found. The gaps in research on law clerk gender may not be due to 
an absence of scholarly interest, but rather a lack of data: despite the founding of the Supreme 
Court over 230 years ago, over 155 years passed until Justice Douglas hired the first female law 
clerk, Lucile Lomen, and another 22 years until Justice Black hired the second female law clerk 
(Danelski, 1999; Wermiel, 2014). Furthermore, Kaheny et al. (2015) note that disparities in 
hiring practices persist to modern times, with female law clerks rarely comprising more than 
40% of the total law clerk population.        
 Several studies throughout this literature provide arguments in support of female law 
clerks bringing diversity of perspectives, enhanced credibility, and expertise to certain sets of 
case issues: Swanson and Wasby (2008) noted that in cases involving civil rights, a state high 
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court judge valued the diversity of perspectives provided by female law clerks, and found that 
law clerks impact the decision making of the judges to a moderate degree; Mauro (2014) 
discussed the possibility of female law clerks bringing diverse opinions and expertise to certain 
issues; Benson (2007, 39) argued that female and minority law clerks hold “enhanced 
credibility” in cases issues pertaining to themselves.      
 Other studies provide detailed lists of descriptive characteristics for law clerks, including 
gender, but do not explicitly utilize law clerk gender as a variable in their analysis, including 
Peppers and Zorn (2008), Kaye and Gastwirth (2009), and Miller (2014).    
 While analyzing the effect law clerk ideology has on judicial decision making between 
the terms 1960 and 2009, Bonica et al. (2017) controlled for the role of law clerk gender in their 
study, swapping out their measure of law clerk ideology for the percent of female clerks per 
term, but did not find any statistically-significant effects upon running their regression analysis. 
While this study indicated that the gender of law clerks is not a confounding term, there is reason 
to doubt broader implications of these findings: the measure of law clerk ideology employed by 
Bonica et al. is only partially complete and has not been utilized or replicated outside of their 
analysis in this paper.         
 Additionally, Kromphardt (2017) developed a comprehensive study of the impact the 
number of female law clerks had on judicial decision making on the merits of cases. Kromphardt 
conducted his analysis through the frame of principal agent theory and provided two theories of 
critical mass and gender credibility to animate his research design. His theory of critical mass 
indicated that differing numbers of female law clerks would impact judicial decision making in 
different ways, with a threshold of female law clerks being required for a substantial increase in 
the influence the female law clerks had over the justice’s decision making. Kromphardt’s 
16 
 
analysis focused on cases of sex discrimination and abortion, issue areas that he argued female 
law clerks would have gender credibility in addressing by dint of their experiences, and 
examined these case issues from the terms 1981 to 2001. He found mixed results for his 
hypothesis, noting that a variable representing two or more female law clerks was correlated with 
justice ideology, but did not find similar results for measures of 1 female law clerk and an 
interaction between the number of female law clerks and justice ideology. Kromphardt’s analysis 
of female law clerks is the only one of its kind, in that a literature review and theory section are 
explicitly built around an independent variable seeking to capture how the number of female law 
clerks impacts judicial decision making—according to him, “women influence their justice’s 
vote on the merits, but this influence is conditional on the number of women a justice hires” 
(183).             
 In conclusion, this section of the literature examines how the gender of female law clerks 
impacts judicial decision making by reference to analyses by Bonica et al. (2017), and 
Kromphardt (2017). 
IV. Theory 
In examining the impact of female law clerks on judicial decision making, it is important to have 
a clearly-defined theoretical account of the mechanisms that explain that interaction—in pursing 
this end, I draw on precedent and information from the literature review to outline models of 
principal agent theory, a theory of female law clerk influence, and critical mass theory.  
Principal Agent Theory 
In explaining the way in which female law clerks interact with the justices that hire them, I adopt 
the model of principle agent theory, which postulates a relationship between two individuals in a 
hierarchy, a principal, and an agent. Principal agent theory is a tool that is widely applied in 
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political science research on law clerks and in a variety of diverse disciples (Peppers, 2006; 
Peppers and Zorn, 2008; Keil, 2005; Gailmard, 2012; Kromhardt, 2014; Gauld, 2016). The 
principal functions as a justice that is overworked and desires to delegate some of their duties to 
another individual, the agent, or law clerk. The principal and the agent may have diverging 
preferred outcomes, and the agent can ultimately choose to shirk their duty in performing tasks 
for the principal. By misaligning their interests with the principal, the agent can then be said to 
exert their own influences on the principal (Peppers, 2006). In practice, law clerks have the 
potential to exert their influence on a justice due to the scope of their duties—law clerks perform 
functions that include researching cases and drafting opinions, tasks that can allow them to 
develop their own opinions that might diverge from a justice (Peppers and Zorn, 2008). While 
this model does well in capturing the hierarchical nature of law clerk and justice, this relationship 
paints a picture of law clerk influence that at times borders on adversarial or coercive.  
A Theory of Female Law Clerk Influence 
I follow Kromphardt (2014; 2017) in adopting an account of the principal agent relationship that 
incorporates the agent as an information source, in which the principal may realize that the 
information held by the agent can be beneficial for both parties in allowing them to achieve their 
shared end. On this view of principal agent theory, a law clerk still functions as an agent that 
performs duties for the principal; however, the principal can allow their beliefs to be influenced 
by the agent, provided that the agent operates as a valuable source of information (2017). In the 
context of the literature on law clerks, law clerks are primarily viewed as valuable information 
sources when they are perceived as having credible knowledge or perspectives about a given area 
of law (Swanson and Wasby, 2008). This credibility is often grounded in the experiences of an 
individual, such as in cases of gendered credibility, in which female law clerks are perceived as 
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having enhanced credibility and input in cases that concern gender-related issues such as sex 
discrimination and abortion (Kaheny et al, 2010; Kromphardt, 2017).    
  In practical terms, research on gender credibility predicts that the influence of female 
law clerks on judicial decision making will on average be valued to a greater extent than their 
male counterparts. For the purposes of this paper, I propose a model of female law clerk 
influence that extends the scope of gender credibility to encompass areas of discrimination and 
civil rights. This extension appears plausible, as it seems reasonable that individuals that may 
have experienced gendered discrimination would be more conscientious of and opposed to 
discrimination manifesting itself other areas: in a 2010 paper, Collins et al. studied the 
relationship between the gender of federal district court judges and their decision making on a 
variety of case issues. The researchers found evidence to support the claim that female judges are 
more inclined to vote liberally on cases concerning civil rights and liberty; additionally, Johnson 
et al. (2011) examined the voting of female Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada, noting that 
they voted more liberally on issues concerning civil rights and equality. On this basis, (1) I 
hypothesize that in years when one female law clerk is hired by a justice, that justice will vote 
more ideologically liberally on case issues related to civil rights. Given the evidence for female 
law clerks exercising gender credibility in the context of certain issues, in addition to the findings 
by Collins et al. and Johnson et al., I predict that the sphere of credibility exercised by female 
law clerks may be broader than previously thought, and encompass issues related to civil rights. 
As issues—such as sex discrimination and sex discrimination in the workplace—that have been 
operationalized in the study of gender credibility fall within the domain of civil rights on the 
Supreme Court, there is further reason to believe that there may be overlap between these case 
issues (Kromphardt, 2017; Spaeth et al., 2018).     
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 Additionally, (2) I hypothesize that in years when one female law clerk is hired by a 
justice, that justice will vote more ideologically liberally on case issues related to discrimination. 
This is because civil rights comprise a broad spectrum of case issues, and it is reasonable to 
assume that female law clerk credibility could manifest itself more strongly in a subsection of 
these cases. Furthermore, if a relevant part of female law clerk credibility pertains to issues of 
sex discrimination, an examination of female law clerk influence on judicial decision making 
that places greater weight on examining issues such as employment discrimination might provide 
cases that capture a similar effect.  
Critical Mass Theory 
As a complement to this theory of female law clerk influence, I rely on critical mass theory to 
provide a more nuanced analysis of how the number of female law clerks per justice might 
impact their decision making. While critical mass theory has its detractors (Dalerup, 2006; 
Childs and Krook, 2008), it enjoys widespread support and use in a multitude of disciplines, 
including the literature on law clerks (Oliver and Marwell, 1988; Cheng and Bernstein, 2014; 
Schwartz-Ziv, 2015; Kromphardt, 2017; Bonica, 2018). Critical mass theory refers to the idea 
that a critical mass of individuals with a shared characteristic will exert greater influence within a 
social context compared to a smaller number of individuals within that same context (Cheng and 
Bernstein, 2014). A critical mass of alike individuals can generate both internal and external 
positive feedback loops of behavior, whereby individuals that obtain a sufficient threshold of 
social consensus feel more comfortable promoting their values and exert more influence in the 
settings they inhabit (Schartz-Ziv, 2015). In the context of the court, an increase in the number of 
female law clerks hired by a justice might trigger a critical mass of representation, enhancing the 
influence female law clerks have on judicial decision making. Consequently, (3) I hypothesize 
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that in years when two or more female law clerks are hired by a justice, that justice will vote 
more ideologically liberally on case issues related to civil rights and (4) discrimination. Critical 
mass theory provides a powerful model for explaining how variations in the number of female 
law clerks might have differential or compounding effects on the decision making of their 
justices. Additionally, some research supports this hypothesis: Mendelbeg et al. (2014) found 
that increased descriptive representation in a small group setting impacted the subjects’ 
vocalization on certain issues, and Karpowitz et al. (2012) determined that in a group setting, a 
majority of female subjects enhanced the deliberative vocalization of the entire group.  
V. Methodology 
Analysis Model 
In attempting to determine the impact of the number of female law clerks on judicial 
decision making over several case issue areas, the data analysis of this study is conducted using a 
logistic regression model. This model was selected to account for justice decision making at the 
level of individual cases, with justice voting direction represented by a binary variable with a 
liberal and conservative value. Additionally, unique justice identification values are used to 
account for clustered standard errors that might arise when the same justices are observed 
multiple times across the period of analysis. 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables in this study are two dummy variables that divide the number of 
female law clerks for a given justice into groups of one female law clerk with all other cases 
being coded as 0, and two or more female law clerks with all other cases being coded as 0. There 
are two functions to partitioning the independent variables in this way. First, utilizing dummy 
variables to represent categorical data such as the number of female law clerks for a justice in a 
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given term allows for an examination of the impact of female law clerks on judicial decision 
making that does not assume that the incrementing of each additional female law clerk has a 
linear effect on the dependent variable. This sensitivity to the varying effects an additional 
female law clerk may have on judicial decision making is an important part in examining 
whether critical mass theory holds explanatory power in determining whether a threshold of 
female law clerks must be reached in order for a discernible increase in influence to be recorded. 
Second, the independent variable, particularly the creation of a two or more female law clerks 
category, is a necessary part of meaningfully interpreting the data: in the entirety of the sample, 
there are only 8 instances in which a justice has hired three female law clerks for a given term, 
and 0 instances in which a justice has hired four female law clerks. In order to ensure that each 
category has a sufficient number of values for a meaningful analysis, I have condensed this 
category into a variable of two or more female law clerks.   
Dependent Variable          
 The dependent variable for this study is justice voting direction on each case, specifically 
for case issues of civil rights and discrimination.  Case issues and issue areas are coded by the 
Supreme Court Database—civil rights is an umbrella issue area that comprises 42 distinct case 
issues, while the discrimination dependent variable covers a subset of 10 core case issues within 
the civil rights category—, which also assigns a binary liberal or conservative decision direction 
for each justice per case, and the dependent variable is operationalized by coding a justice vote in 
a liberal direction as 1, and a justice vote in a conservative direction as 0. By using a logistic 
regression model, this paper examines how the number of female law clerks impacts judicial 
decision making on a case by case basis for issue areas of civil rights and discrimination. The 
regression coefficient of the number of female law clerks on justices’ liberal voting direction 
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provides an opportunity for discovering a correlation between the independent and dependent 
variables, which in term would provide supporting evidence for the theoretical underpinnings 
utilized in this paper. 
Control Variables 
Concerning analysis of the Supreme Court, there are a wide variety of confounding variables that 
must be controlled for. Drawing on the selection of control variables in the literature, this paper 
focuses on three in particular: justice ideology, justice gender, and law clerk partisanship 
(Kromphardt, 2015; Bonica et al., 2016; Kromphardt 2017). Justice ideology appears to be one 
of the most probable candidates for competing variables, given that measures of justice ideology 
that are accurate in predicting justice decision making are commonplace in the literature (Segal 
and Cover, 1989; Martin and Quinn, 2002). Importantly, a control for justice ideology must be a 
constant and reliable measure, as measures like the Martin–Quinn scores are themselves based 
upon justice voting in a given term and could not be used to control for judicial ideology in the 
context of law clerk influence during that same term. Therefore, I utilize Segal–Cover scores for 
the justices, static and reliable measures of judicial ideology that are calculated prior to their 
confirmation (Segal and Cover, 1989).        
 Several studies indicate that statistically-significant differences in judicial decision 
making occur on the basis of judge or justice gender (Yahya and Stribopoulos, 2012; Gleason et 
al. 2018). In order to account for any potential effects justice gender may have on their percent 
liberal decision in cases concerning civil rights and discrimination, I code judicial gender as a 
dummy variable and include it as a control.        
 Controlling for law clerk partisanship is essential in this paper, as without it any influence 
female law clerks might be reported as exerting over a justice’s voting direction for a given case 
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might be attributable to the law clerks’ ideology, rather than their gender (Bonica et al., 2016). 
At present, no complete measure of law clerk ideology exists for the 2004–2017 term period: to 
correct for this, I follow Kromphardt and create a measure of law clerk partisanship based upon 
the partisanship of the president that appointed the judge that each individual clerked for prior to 
being hired by members of the Supreme Court (2015). This operationalization is possible given 
the widespread trend of law clerks working under a lower federal district or appellate court 
judges—of the 504 law clerks in this sample, every one of them had been previously hired by a 
lower-level court, and only one had clerked for a state supreme court justice instead of a district 
or appellate court judge. While untested by other analyses in the literature, there is some reason 
to suspect that this measure provides a passable account of law clerk partisanship: focusing on 
the ideology of district and appellate court judges, as well as that of presidential appointees, has 
been a valid strategy in examinations of the Court in other eras (Kromphardt 2017). Additionally, 
this measure has the important feature of providing an account of law clerk partisanship that is 
divorced from justice ideology. A variable of law clerk partisanship that is not separated from a 
measure of justice ideology is at risk of being endogenous.  
Data 
The data used in this study was collected from several sources: the data for the dependent 
variable used in this paper comes from the Supreme Court Database and comprise the terms from 
2004 to 2017: the start of the period of analysis was selected based upon the endpoint of a paper 
examining similar topics related to female law clerks, and the end corresponds to the last judicial 
term that is currently in the Supreme Court Database (Kromphardt, 2017). Information about the 
identity of law clerks, in addition to the names of the federal district and court of appeals judges 
that they clerked for, was provided by the Supreme Court Public Information Office, while I 
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coded information about the gender and partisanship of the law clerks based upon this data: clerk 
gender was assigned by conducting a web search of each clerk’s name and matching it to the 
pronouns provided by the biographical text of professional web pages detailing the clerk’s 
experience on the Court. While conducting web searches in order to determine the gender of law 
clerks may appear crude and unsystematic, there is reason to think that this method is appropriate 
given the dearth of alternate sources: first, after their term expires, law clerks frequently maintain 
prominent profiles in various legal and scholarly professions and often accompany biographical 
information on websites with the usage of gendered pronouns and photo identification. Second, 
this method is not unseen in other scholarly works, and is employed in similar studies that 
examine law clerk gender (Kaheny, 2015; Bonica et al., 2016).   
 Unfortunately, a more precise and thorough measure of law clerk ideology that goes 
beyond estimating partisanship did not exist during the years being analyzed in this paper. 
Several studies provide survey and questionnaire data with self-reported partisanship and 
descriptive statistics concerning law clerks, or have centered on measures that rely on Judicial 
Common Space Scores but are unavailable after 2001; these findings are often limited in scope 
to the latter half of the 20th century in part due to the insular nature of the Court and a historical 
unwillingness of justices and law clerks to provide contemporary insight into the workings of the 
court (Peppers and Zorn, 2007; Epstein at al., 2007; Kromphardt, 2017). A novel approach by 
Bonica et al. (2016, 2018) provides individualized data on law clerk ideology by assigning a 
score to each law clerk on the basis of their monetary contributions to various political 
organizations; although this data set extends to 2014, it is hampered by missing data values, as 
over 30% of the law clerks in the paper did not make a monetary contribution to any political 
organization. Furthermore, the gaps in the data do not appear to be evenly dispersed throughout 
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its entire range, making the model insufficient for use in this paper (2016). While this paper’s 
operationalization of law clerk partisanship may not have the precedent of established analytic 
robustness, its adherence to comparable models provides justification for its being an acceptable 
measure (Kromphardt, 2017). 
VI. Data Analysis 
In this analysis I first present tables depicting the number of female law clerks hired by justices 
per year over the period of analysis, in addition to the overall percent liberal vote of justices 
across cases by ideology, conducting difference of means tests on the cell values and discussing 
the results. Next, I examine the composition of law clerks by partisanship, gender, and justice 
ideology, conduct chi-squared tests on each table, and discuss the results. I follow by running 
logistic regression models for my dependent variable by separately analyzing the impact of each 
independent and control variable on the dependent variable, and finish with a logistic regression 
model that incorporates all variables in the analysis.    
Table 1. Total Number of Female Law Clerks Hired Per Term 
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 Table 1 shows the number of female law clerks present per term out of 36. Although 
there is some variation in hiring practices between terms, the data indicate that an average of 12–
13 female law clerks were hired by justices per year over the period of analysis, an average 
comprising slightly more than a third of the total number of clerks hired per year.   
 In Table 2, I begin by examining the differences in liberal ideological vote percentage on 
the basis of justice ideology—binned into equal percentile quartiles based on scanned cases— 
and the case issues at hand: there appears to be a clear trend across each row from most 
conservative to most liberal justice ideology that corresponds with an increase in percent liberal 
vote across each of the three case areas. More interestingly, there appears to be a positive 
increase in percent liberal vote between the row providing the mean percent liberal vote in all 
cases and both the mean percent liberal vote in civil rights cases and mean percent liberal vote in 
discrimination cases rows for moderately and most liberal justices. In order to determine whether 
there is a statistically significant difference between the mean percent liberal votes in these cells, 
I conducted eight two-tailed difference of means tests between the rows containing the percent 
liberal vote for civil rights and discrimination cases and the row containing the percent liberal 
vote for all cases—in both the most conservative and moderately conservative columns, none of 
the four comparisons yielded a statistically-significant p value, giving t and p values from left to 
right of 1.1 and .27, .2 and .87, .8 and .42, and .7 and .52. Next, with values that range from left 
to right for the moderately liberal and most liberal justices in the second row, both mean liberal 
vote percentages reported statistically-significant t and p values of 2.1 and .04, and 3.7 and .01, 
indicating a robust difference between means for each value compared to the corresponding cell 
in the row above. Conversely, in the row corresponding to the mean liberal vote percentage for 
discrimination cases, only the value in the most liberal column recorded statistically-significant t 
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and p values of 2.1 and .04; for moderately liberal justices in this row, a difference of means test 
did not provide a statistically-significant result, with t and p values of 1.4 and .17.   
 These findings provide preliminary evidence for the fittingness of civil rights and 
discrimination cases in capturing issues that record a greater percent liberal vote for liberal 
justices relative to the average percent liberal vote for the entirety of the cases in the period of 
analysis. Importantly, while 3 of the 4 difference of means tests for moderate and most liberal 
justices returned statistically-significant t and p values, they do not provide evidence that 
establishes either a correlation or causation between an independent variable and the percent 
liberal vote in each of these case issue sets. Furthermore, the failed difference of means test for 
moderately liberal justices relative to their percent liberal vote in cases concerning 
discrimination, as well as all conservative justices, does not indicate anything more definitive 
than an inability to reject the null hypothesis in explaining differences in percent liberal vote 
between cells. It remains important to conduct a logistic regression on these two case issue 
groups in order to better understand why their justice mean percent liberal vote is in some 




























42% 52% 58% 73%* 
Note: Mean % Liberal Vote for all Terms, 2004–2017. * indicates p < .05. 
 
An examination of Table 3 provides interesting descriptive information about the hiring 
practices of justices by their ideology: although there appear to be some slight differences in the 
hiring practices of male and female law clerks for moderately liberal and moderately 
conservative justices, this observation is by no means conclusive. In order to see whether there is 
a statistically-significant difference in the expected and observed frequencies of liberal male and 
female law clerks in this table, I ran a chi-squared test; however, with a chi-squared value of 2.7 
and a p value of .428, I am unable to reject the null hypothesis.  







Most Liberal Total 
Female 
Liberal Clerk 
50% (5) 33% (10) 45% (22) 51% (45) 46% (82) 
Male Liberal 
Clerk 
50% (5) 67% (20) 55% (27) 49% (44) 54% (96) 
Total 100% (10) 100% (30) 100% (49) 100% (89) 100% (178) 




A purely visual examination of the variance in the number of conservative law clerks by 
justice ideology in Table 3 appears to show significant differences, with the most conservative 
justices hiring almost 90 more male conservative law clerks than female conservative law clerks; 
however, in order to make a statistically-justified evaluation, I again run a chi-squared test. This 
test yields a chi-squared value of 13.8 and a p value of .003, significantly smaller than the p < .05 
measure of statistical significance. Consequently, there is a significant difference between the 
expected and observed frequencies of law clerks within this table, and the null hypothesis can be 
rejected. Given the outcome of this chi-squared test, it appears important that I controlled for 
each of the variables in this table in my logistic regression model.  















80% (123) 57% (38) 72% (51) 66% (23) 72% (235) 
Total 100% (153) 100% (67) 100% (71) 100% (35) 100% (326) 
Note: Number of conservative clerks by gender, 2004–2017. Chi-squared: 13.8, p: .003.  
 
Testing Hypotheses 1 and 3: The number of female law clerks impacts judicial decision making 
in cases concerning civil rights  
 Before directly testing whether the number of female law clerks for a justice impacts their 
voting decision direction in civil rights cases, I analyzed the impact of several control variables 
on this dependent variable. To conduct this analysis, I utilized a logistic regression model—the 
results are presented in the first three columns of Table 5. When reading Tables 5 and 6, 
statistically-significant results—when the p value is less than .05—are indicated by an asterisk, 
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while the top value depicts the regression coefficient and the value in parentheses represents the 
clustered robust standard error.         
 This logistic regression model indicated that an individual analysis of the three controls 
justice ideology, justice gender, and law clerk partisanship generated a statistically-significant p 
value for each variable, indicating that for the results of these preliminary tests, the value of each 
variable wielded some predictive power over the vote direction of justices in cases with a central 
issue related to civil rights. Of these three values, the regression coefficient for justice ideology 
remained the largest, providing evidence that the operationalization of this variable was effective 
given the assumed correlation between liberal judicial ideology and liberal judicial decision 
making.            
 An examination of the variable that captured terms in which one female law clerk was 
present for a given justice revealed no statistically-significant relationship between itself and the 
dependent variable; however, the binned two or more female law clerks category recorded a 
modest coefficient with a p value of less than .01. While these mixed results appeared to provide 
mixed support for hypotheses 1 and 3, with the first hypothesis failing to generate statistically-
significant results and the third hypothesis returning a value with a p value less than .01, the 
logistic regression model analysis of these variables that controlled for justice ideology, justice 
gender, and law clerk partisanship revealed no relationship between the number of female law 
clerks for a justice and judicial decision making concerning civil rights that could not be 
explained by random chance. Ultimately, a statistically significant relationship with the 
dependent variable remained only for justice ideology and law clerk partisanship. As mentioned 
above, it is unsurprising that justice ideology is correlated with the direction of a justice’s vote 
for civil rights cases, as the ideology of a justice is essential in determining the partisan direction 
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of their vote for a given case; however, the association between law clerk partisanship and the 
voting direction of justices in civil rights cases, independent of the effects of a critical mass of 
female law clerks and with a p value < .01, provides tentative evidence for the influence of law 
clerk partisanship, rather than gender, on the decision making of justices.     
 In summary, while preliminary testing indicated that the presence of two or more female 
law clerks was correlated with justices voting in a liberal direction in cases with issues related to 
civil rights, this relationship disappeared when controlling for other factors related to the 
dependent variable, effectively failing to reject the null hypothesis for both hypotheses in this 
selection of cases. In other words, based upon the theoretical assumptions of this paper, the 
number of female law clerks employed by Justice Ginsburg for a given term would be expected 
to exert influence over her voting direction in cases involving civil rights due to their enhanced 
gender credibility in these case areas, and the findings in this analysis did not support that these 
assumptions. Instead, correlations between justice ideology and justice liberal vote direction, as 
well as between law clerk partisanship and the dependent variable, provide an alternate—albeit 











































































-- -- -- -- 
 




Wald Chi2 62.02** 18.92** 178.05** 2.94 7.87** 395.76** 













Observations 1,538 1,538 1,538 1,538   1,538 1,538 
Note: Dependent variable in each model is a binary value corresponding to either a liberal or conservative vote 
direction by a justice in a given case. Table entries are regression coefficients for a logistic regression model, the 
value in parentheses indicates the clustered robust standard error, * indicates p < .05, and ** indicates p < .01. 
 
Testing Hypotheses 2 and 4: The number of female law clerks impacts judicial decision making 
in cases concerning discrimination 
Because the effects of female law clerks on justice liberal vote direction might be muted or 
nonexistent if a sample of case issues doesn’t accurately reflect my theoretical account of female 
law clerk credibility with issues related to discrimination, I reduce the civil rights sample pool 
issue areas from 42 down to 10 central categories: sex discrimination, sex discrimination in the 
work place, employment discrimination, desegregation, desegregation in schools, voting, voting 
rights, affirmative action, Indians, and Indians outside of state jurisdiction. While a consequence 
of this issue area reduction is a corresponding decline in the total number of observations used in 
the logistic regression, the ability to more precisely engage with the theoretical model of this 
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paper provides important justification for that reduction.     
 A preliminary analysis of justice ideology with a logistic regression model indicates that 
a statistically-significant relationship exists between the ideology of justices and the liberal 
voting direction of justices for cases focusing on discrimination, with a regression coefficient 
that is comparable to the value assigned in the examination of justices’ percent liberal vote on the 
basis of civil rights. Additionally, similar findings occur for both justice gender and law clerk 
partisanship.          
 Importantly, an analysis of how the number of female law clerks for a given justice 
impacted the dependent variable failed to provide statistically-significant results for either 
hypothesis 2 or hypothesis 4, with each variable receiving a p value greater than .05. After 
running a logistic regression model analysis that includes all independent and control variables, a 
lack of an association between these independent variables and liberal voting direction by justice 
persists. Additionally, any statistically-significant results disappeared for justice gender, although 
both justice ideology and law clerk partisanship maintained p values < .05 and < .01. These 
results appear to reinforce the findings displayed in Table 4: when a logistic regression that 
incorporates all covariates is conducted, only the variables of justice ideology and law clerk 
partisanship have statistically-significant coefficients.      
 Taken together, an analysis of these two hypotheses fails to provide compelling evidence 
for the claim that the number of female law clerks impacts the liberal vote direction of justices in 
cases of discrimination. Furthermore, none of the independent variables remained statistically 
significant over the course of either of these tests, resulting in a failure to reject the null 
hypothesis for the entirety of the four hypotheses. While this failure to reject the null hypothesis 
does not entail that it is impossible to do so in another context with a different set of case issues, 
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doing so is not within the scope of this paper.        
 Importantly, the findings in this data analysis section provide preliminary evidence for 
the impact of law clerk partisanship on justice decision making: the number of female law clerks 
for a justice in a given term may have little impact over the justice’s liberal vote direction; 
however, the partisanship of the justice’s law clerks might have greater sway over this dependent 
variable.           
 Alternatively, the partisanship of a justice’s law clerks, on top of the gender of those law 
clerks, might have disproportionate effects on a justice’s liberal vote direction. In order to better 
understand the relationship between law clerk partisanship and law clerk gender, I conducted an 
analysis of the interaction between the two variables, examining how the gender of law clerks 
interacts with both liberal and conservative law clerk partisanship. In both cases, and for case 
issue areas of civil rights and discrimination, I did not find a statistically-significant relationship 
between these variables. This analysis indicates that while the gender of Supreme Court law 
clerks has little impact on judicial decision making, the partisanship of these law clerks does play 
a role in justice liberal vote direction for these cases. In other words, based upon the findings of 
this study, it seems unjustified to draw conclusions about the influence of law clerks based solely 
on their gendered identity; instead, the ideas and ideology of law clerks appear to have the 
potential to exert influence on the decision making of justices. In practice, while the gender of 
Justice Ginsburg’s law clerks might appear to influence her voting direction in cases involving 
civil rights and discrimination, the findings of this data analysis indicate that any influence the 
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Wald Chi2 41.12** 16.78** 95.05** 0.63 3.21 133.92** 













Observations 575 575 575 575   575 575 
Note: Dependent variable in each model is a binary value corresponding to either a liberal or conservative vote 
direction by a justice in a given case. Table entries are regression coefficients for a logistic regression model, the 
value in parentheses indicates the clustered robust standard error, * indicates p < .05, and ** indicates p < .01. 
 
VII. Discussion 
In summary, none of the four hypotheses generated a statistically-significant estimate of fixed 
effects when justice ideology, justice gender, and law clerk partisanship were controlled for. 
Although at present, there is little evidence for the number of female law clerks impacting 
judicial decision making in the case areas of civil rights and discrimination, further examination 
of case issues related to civil rights, equality, gendered issues, or discrimination might yield 
different results. Additionally, justice ideology and law clerk partisanship appeared to be reliably 
correlated with justices’ voting in a liberal direction on a variety of case issue areas, including 
for the percent liberal decisions over all of the cases during the 2004–2017 terms (see Appendix 
A), indicating that these variables provide a portion of the explanatory power in determining 
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influences on justices’ voting direction.       
 Furthermore, statistically-significant findings for the difference of means tests in liberal 
justice percent decision making across the dependent variables provides a direction for further 
analysis in the future. Additionally, a statistically-significant chi-squared test examining the 
judicial hiring practices of male and female law clerks by partisanship has the potential for 
further research, starting with an examination of the interaction between justice ideology, law 
clerk partisanship, and law clerk gender.         
  While there are several factors of the research design, such as the type and number of 
case issues for the dependent variable, that might explain a failure to reject the null hypothesis in 
this analysis, a central limitation to this study is the scarcity of cases for key issue areas within 
the subgroup of civil rights. Over the 14-year period of analysis in this paper, many variables of 
interest, such as sex discrimination, appeared only several times every term. Consequently, even 
if female law clerks do exert a certain amount of influence on judicial decision making in a 
certain subsection of case issues, it may be difficult to ever identify and measure this impact. 
One solution to this problem is to increase the scope of analysis; however, this method has its 
own drawbacks, as any interesting effects that might occur during certain eras of the Court might 
be diluted over time.           
 Another space for methodological error occurs in the assignment of gender to a law clerk 
on the basis of superficial characteristics. As there was no official list for me to reference, I was 
forced to code and record the gender of each law clerk on my own. While the method I employed 
of identifying the pronouns and pictures of former law clerks appears to be quite effective, the 
ability to verify the accuracy of a list is invaluable for precise data analysis in this field.  
 An important problem with the analysis of law clerk influence on judicial behavior is the 
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circumstances under which law clerks interact with a justice: given the absence of information 
about the distribution of work among law clerks—as well as differing judicial preferences in the 
utilization of law clerks—researchers studying law clerks are often forced to assume that law 
clerk influence on their justice is constant across the term or across cases of a certain type. 
Unfortunately, it is likely that there are instances in which this assumption is inappropriate or 
incomplete: as Peppers (2006) noted, Justice Blackmun gave his law clerks great license in the 
debating and drafting of opinions, whereas others restricted their law clerks to more menial tasks. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that law clerks are systematically assigned to work on all or a subset 
of cases; rather, it appears plausible that law clerk work is spread across a multitude of cases and 
issues and is influenced by the work of other clerks, complicating the assumptions papers such as 
this one make about the particular impact female law clerks have in cases related to such issues 
as civil rights and discrimination.        
 Finally, discussion of law clerks and their influence on judicial decision making faces an 
even more central problem beyond the particulars of this paper’s research design: a justice 
decides which law clerks to hire. Given each justice’s direct control over the criteria by which 
they select their law clerks for each term, independent variables that seek to measure law clerk 
influence over a justice may be endogenous, in that the characteristics of a law clerk that 
researchers might seek to quantify, like gender or ideology, might be foundationally selected for 
or influenced by the justice hiring that law clerk.       
 While these problems may make it difficult to definitively assign causality to judicial 
behavior on the basis of law clerk influence, there are several ways in which to alleviate their 
potency. As the study of law clerks is a burgeoning field, the full array of research and 
methodological design for an experiment has often not been entirely taken advantage of. In 
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particular, continued surveys, interviews, and case studies of the Supreme Court might serve to 
refine quantitative models used in studying the Court, and affective language analysis of 
Supreme Court opinions might help identify law clerk influence directly in the work of their 
justice. Tentative findings in this paper lend support to the body of literature examining the 
impact of law clerk partisanship on judicial decision making, and although I did not succeed in 
rejecting the null hypotheses for my research, examining the impact of either law clerk 
partisanship or the number of female law clerks on judicial decision making for a different set of 
case issues might prove more fruitful. 
VIII. Conclusion 
Over the course of this thesis paper, I have sought to examine how law clerk gender has 
impacted the decision making of justices by constructing a theoretical account of female law 
clerk credibility that is framed by principal agent theory, based in an expansion of gendered 
credibility that includes measures of discrimination and civil rights in that analysis, and 
understood through the compounding effects of critical mass theory. I have provided a 
background and literature review of the ideological and gendered ways in which researchers of 
law clerks typically choose to analyze their subjects and have utilized a quantitative research 
design to test my theory using four hypotheses. Ultimately, I was unable to find results that 
supported my theoretical account and research design, as controls for my independent variables 
proved effective, and the null hypothesis could not be rejected. Nevertheless, justice ideology, 
and more importantly, my measure of law clerk partisanship proved to be correlated with my 
dependent variables focusing on justice liberal voting direction in case areas concerning 
discrimination, civil rights, and ultimately, all cases (see Appendix). The literature surrounding 
analysis of the gender of Supreme Court law clerks remains a relatively small portion of the 
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modest field of law clerk scholarship. More remains to be examined in this area, particularly 
concerning how female law clerks impact judicial decision making in a variety of case issues. 
My thesis has attempted to make a small contribution to this end; while my findings were 
ultimately unable to definitively identify any relationship between the number of female law 
clerks and judicial decision making in issues of civil rights and discrimination, this is not to say 
that such a connection can never be found. 
Appendix A: 








































































Wald Chi2 69.40** 18.24** 218.57** 4.65* 14.91** 219.35** 













Observations 9,421 9,421 9,421 9,421 9,421 9,421 
 
Note: Dependent variable in each model is a binary value corresponding to either a liberal or conservative vote 
direction by a justice in a given case. Table entries are regression coefficients for a logistic regression model, the 
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